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Abstract—Bayesian probability theory is one of the most
successful frameworks to model reasoning under uncertainty.
Its defining property is the interpretation of probabilities as
degrees of belief in propositions about the state of the world
relative to an inquiring subject. This essay examines the notion
of subjectivity by drawing parallels between Lacanian theory and
Bayesian probability theory, and concludes that the latter must be
enriched with causal interventions to model agency. The central
contribution of this work is an abstract model of the subject
that accommodates causal interventions in a measure-theoretic
formalisation. This formalisation is obtained through a game-
theoretic Ansatz based on modelling the inside and outside of the
subject as an extensive-form game with imperfect information
between two players. Finally, I illustrate the expressiveness of
this model with an example of causal induction.
Index Terms—Subjectivity; Bayesian Probability Theory;
Causality
I. INTRODUCTION
EARLY modern thinkers of the Enlightenment—spurredby the developments of empirical science, modern po-
litical organisation, and the shift from collective religion to
personal cults—found in the free, autonomous, and rational
subject the locus on which to ground all of knowledge
(Mansfield, 2000). Most notably, Descartes, with his axiom
cogito ergo sum (‘I think, therefore I am’), put forward the idea
that the thought process of the subject is an unquestionable fact
from which all other realities derive—in particular of oneself,
and in general of everything else (Descartes, 1637).
This proposition initiated a long-lasting debate among
philosophers such as Rousseau and Kant, and its discussion
played a fundamental roˆle in shaping modern Western thought.
Indeed, the concept of the subject operates at the heart of
our core institutions: the legal and political organisation rests
on the assumption of the free and autonomous subject for
matters of responsibility of action and legitimisation of ruling
bodies; capitalism, the predominant economic system, depends
on forming, through the tandem system of education and
marketing, subjects that engage in work and consumerism
(Burkitt, 2008); natural sciences equate objective truth with
inter-subjective experience (Kim, 2005); and so forth.
Nowadays, questions about subjectivity are experiencing
renewed interest from the scientific and technological commu-
nities. Recent technological advances, such as the availability
of massive and ubiquitous computational capacity, the internet,
and improved robotic systems, have triggered the proliferation
of autonomous systems that monitor, process and deploy
information at a scale and extension that is unprecedented
in history. Today we have social networks that track user
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preferences and deliver personalised mass media, algorithmic
trading systems that account for a large proportion of the trades
at stock exchanges, unmanned vehicles that navigate and map
unexplored terrain. What are the “users” that a social network
aims to model? What does an autonomous system know and
what can it learn? Can an algorithm be held responsible for
its actions? Furthermore, latest progress in neuroscience has
both posed novel questions and revived old ones, ranging
from investigating the neural bases of perception, learning,
and decision making, to understanding the nature of free will
(Sejnowski and van Hemmen, 2006). Before these questions
can be addressed in a way that is adequate for the mathematical
disciplines, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by a subject
in a way that enables a quantitative discussion.
The program of this essay is threefold. First, I will argue that
Bayesian probability theory is a subjectivist theory, encoding
many of our implicit cultural assumptions about subjectivity.
To support this claim, I will show that some basic concepts in
Bayesian probability theory have a counterpart in Lacanian
theory, which is used in cultural studies as a conceptual
framework to structure the discourse about subjectivity. In
the second part, I will put forward the claim that Bayesian
probability theory needs to be enriched with causal interven-
tions to model agency. Finally, I will consolidate the ideas
on subjectivity in an abstract mathematical synthesis. The
main contribution of this formalisation is the measure-theoretic
generalisation of causal interventions.
II. SUBJECTIVITY IN LACANIAN THEORY
To artificial intelligence, statistics, and economics, the ques-
tions about subjectivity are not novel at all: many can be traced
back to the early discussions at the beginning of the twentieth
century that eventually laid down the very foundations of
these fields. Naturally, these ideas did not spring out of a
vacuum, but followed the general trends and paradigms of
the time. In particular, many of the fundamental concepts
about subjectivity seem to have emerged from interdisciplinary
cross-fertilisation.
For instance, in the humanities, several theories of sub-
jectivity were proposed. These can be roughly subdivided
into two dominant approaches (Mansfield, 2000): the subjec-
tivist/psychoanalytic theories, mainly associated with Freud
and Lacan, which see the subject as a thing that can be
conceptualised and studied (see e.g. Freud, 1899; Fink, 1996);
and the anti-subjectivist theories, mainly associated with the
works of Nietzsche and Foucault, which regard any attempt
at defining the subject as a tool of social control, product of
the culture and power of the time (Nietzsche, 1887; Foucault,
1964).
For our discussion, it is particularly useful to investigate the
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2relation to Lacan1, firstly because it is a subjectivist theory and
secondly because its abstract nature facilitates establishing the
relation to Bayesian probability theory. Some ideas that are
especially relevant are the following.
The subject is a construct. There is a consensus among the-
orists (both subjectivist and anti-subjectivists) that the subject
is not born into the world as a unified entity. Instead, her
constitution as a unit is progressively built as she experiences
the world (Mansfield, 2000). The specifics of this unity vary
across the different accounts, but roughly speaking, they all
take on the form of an acquired sense of separation between a
self (inside) and the rest of the world (outside). For instance,
during the early stages of their lives, children have to learn
that their limbs belong to them. In Lacan for instance, this
distinction is embodied in the terms I and the Other (Fig. 1a).
Crucially, Lacan stresses that the subject is precisely this
“membrane” between inward and outward flow (Fink, 1996).
I
(inside)
the Other
(outside) the Symbolic
(language)
the Real
(unintelligible)
the objet petit a
(cause, teleology)
a) b)
the Imaginary
(subjective reality)
Fig. 1. The subject in Lacanian theory.
The subject is split. Structurally, the subject is divided into
a part that holds beliefs about the world, and a part that
governs the organisation and dynamics of those beliefs in
an automatic fashion. The most well-known instantiation of
this idea is the Freudian distinction between the conscious
and the unconscious, where the latter constitutes psychological
material that is repressed, but nevertheless accessible through
dreams and involuntary manifestations such as a “slip of the
tongue” (Freud, 1899). Here however, the interpretation that is
more pertinent to our analysis is Lacan’s. In his terminology,
the two aforementioned parts correspond to the imaginary
and the symbolic registers respectively (Fig. 1b). Simply put,
the imaginary can be described as the collection of concepts
or images that, when pieced together, make up the totality
of the subject’s ontology: in particular, the world and the
subject’s sense of self. In other words, the imaginary register is
responsible for entertaining hypotheses about reality. In turn,
these images are organised by the symbolic register into a
network of meaning that is pre-given, static, and “structured
like a language” (Lacan, 1977).
1It shall be noted however, that Lacan’s work is notoriously difficult to
understand, partly due to the complexity and constant revisions of his ideas,
but most importantly due to his dense, multi-layered, and obscure prose style.
As a result, the interpretation presented here is based on my own reading of
it, which was significantly influenced by Fink (1996), Mansfield (2000) and
the work by Zˇizˇek (Zˇizˇek, 1992, 2009).
Language is a system of signification. Many of the modern
ideas about knowledge and subjectivity are centred around
language. In this view, the subject is seen as a signifying
entity that produces and consumes signs (linguistic mate-
rial) in the form of spoken language, images, and general
sensorimotor expression (de Saussure, 1916). Language then
can be thought of as a system of signs that operates by
detecting signifiers (labels) and associating them to signifieds
(meanings or ideas)—possibly in cascade, with the signifieds
being the signifiers of later stages. Crucially, the associations
between signifiers and signifieds are arbitrary and contingent,
established by pure convention (think of ‘apple’, ‘manzana’,
‘mela’, ‘Apfel’, ‘pomme’, ‘חופת’, etc.). The influence of these
views is witnessed by the adoption of related ideas by thinkers
from fields ranging from logic (Russell, 1905; Wittgenstein,
1921-1933), philosophy of language (Wittgenstein, 1953),
phenomenology (Heidegger, 1927), rhetoric (Knape, 2000),
and linguistics/cognitivism (Chomsky, 1957) to computer sci-
ence (Turing, 1936–1937) and biology/cybernetics (Maturana,
1970; Maturana and Varela, 1987).
The real is the engine of the subject. The imaginary and
the symbolic registers refer to the subject’s intellect, that
is, to the organisation of the things that she can potentially
comprehend or experience, and their structure is static. There
is a third register in Lacan’s conceptualisation, namely the real
(Fig. 1b), representing the unintelligible, random source of
external perturbations that the subject picks up and integrates
into her symbolic domain in the form of sense-data, thereby
setting her knownledge in motion (compare e.g. to the “web
of beliefs” of Quine (1951)).
Teleology. Finally, there is the question of purposeful be-
haviour. In Lacan, teleology (see Fig. 1a) is related to what
he calls the objet petit a: that is, an unexpected incoherence
that interrupts the otherwise regular chain of signification
(Lacan, 1973; Zˇizˇek, 1992). Such an interruption has two
consequences that are worth pointing out. First, the deviation
from the regular chain of signification can be thought of as an
expression of spontaneous desire, i.e. a sudden jerk that steers
the chain into different, preferred consequences. Second, the
interrupted signifying chain, by injecting randomness, intro-
duces an independence of choice that entails a responsibility,
a claim to ownership of cause, and a post-rationalisation of
the subject’s decisions. In short: a detected irregularity signals
agency. For instance, in the sequence
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10,
the missing number 7 breaks the pattern and can give the
impression that it was intentionally omitted.
III. SUBJECTIVITY IN BAYESIAN PROBABILITY THEORY
In the mathematical disciplines, one of the most prominent
theories dealing with subjectivity is Bayesian probability the-
ory. Its current formal incarnation came to be as a synthesis
of many fields such as measure theory (see e.g. Lebesgue,
1902; Kolmogorov, 1933), set theory (Cantor, 1874), and logic
(Frege, 1892; Russell, 1905; Wittgenstein, 1921-1933). After
Bayes’ and Laplace’s initial epistemic usage of probabilities,
3founders of modern probability theory have explicitly started
using probabilities as degrees of subjective belief. On one
hand, they have postulated that subjective probabilities can
be inferred by observing actions that reflect personal beliefs
(Ramsey, 1931; De Finetti, 1937; Savage, 1954); on the other
hand, they regarded probabilities as extensions to logic under
epistemic limitations (Cox, 1961; Jaynes and Bretthorst, 2003).
Importantly, both accounts rely on a subject that does statistics
in the world having belief updates governed by Bayes’ rule.
Bayesian probability theory, in its capacity as a subjectivist
theory, can be related to ideas in Lacanian theory. Recall that
formally, probability theory provides axiomatic foundations
for modelling experiments2 involving randomness. Such a
randomised experiment takes the form of a probability space
(Ω,F ,P), where Ω is a set of possible states of nature, F is
a σ-algebra on Ω (a collection of subsets of Ω that is closed
under countably many set operations, comprising complement,
union, and intersection), and P is a probability measure over
F . Given this setup, I suggest the following correspondences,
summarised in Tab. I:
1) Real ↔ generative/true distribution. In probability the-
ory, it is assumed that there exists a source that secretly
picks the state of Nature ω ∈ Ω that is then progressively
“revealed” through measurements. Some measure theory
textbooks even allude to the irrational, unintelligible
quality of the source3 by using the phrase “Tyche, the
goddess of chance, picks a sample” to describe this
choice (see for instance Billingsley, 1978; Williams,
1991).
2) Symbolic ↔ probability space. Conceptually, the σ-
algebra F of a probability space contains the universe
of all the yes/no questions (i.e. propositions) that the
subject can entertain. A particular aspect of a given state
of Nature ω is extracted via a corresponding random
variable X : Ω → X , mapping ω into a symbol X(ω)
from a set of symbols X . Random variables can be
combined to form complex aspects, and the ensuing
symbols are consistent (i.e. free of contradictions) as
guaranteed by construction. Thus, a probability space
and the associated collection of random variables make
up the structure of the potential realities that the subject
can hope to comprehend. Furthermore, one can associate
to each random variable at least one of three roˆles (but
typically just one), detailed next.
3) Imaginary ↔ hypotheses. A random variable can play
the roˆle of a latent feature of the state of Nature.
Latent variables furnish the sensorimotor space with
a conceptual or signifying structure, and a particular
configuration of these variables constitutes a hypothesis
in the Bayesian sense. Because of this function, we can
associate the collection of latent variables to Lacan’s
imaginary register.
2Here, I will use the word experiment in a very broad sense, including the
thought processes of the subject throughout her entire life.
3Note that this allusion goes at least as far back as Hesiod’s Theogony
dating from the pre-philosophical era. The Theogony describes the creation
of the world by the muses—a literary device used at the time standing for
something that is unintelligible.
4) Flow between I and the Other ↔ actions & observa-
tions. The hypotheses by themselves do not ground the
subject’s symbolic domain to any reality however—for
this, variables modelling interactions are required. These
variables capture symbols that appear in the sensorimo-
tor stream of the subject, that is, at her boundary with the
world, modelling the directed symbolic flow occurring
between the I and the Other; in particular, the out- and
inward flows are represented by actions and observations
respectively.
5) Objet petit a↔ causal intervention. The last connection
I would like to establish, which will become a central
theme in what follows, is between the object petit a and
causal interventions. Lacanian theory explains agency
in terms of a kink in the signifying chain—that is,
the interruption of a pre-existing relation between two
symbols—that is subjectivised in hindsight (Fink, 1996;
Zˇizˇek, 1992). One crucial aspect of this notion is that
it requires the comparison between two instants of the
signifying network, namely the one where the relation
is still intact and the resulting one where the relation
is absent, adding a dynamic element to the static sym-
bolic order. This element has no analogue in standard
probability theory. However, the last twenty years have
witnessed the systematic study of what appears to be an
analogous idea in the context of probabilistic causality.
More precisely, the interruption of the signifying chain
is a causal intervention (Pearl, 2009).
TABLE I
LACANIAN AND BAYESIAN THEORIES OF THE SUBJECT.
Lacan Bayes
real (register) ←→ true distribution
symbolic (register) ←→ probability space
imaginary (register) ←→ hypotheses
the Other → I (flow) ←→ observations
I → the Other (flow) ←→ actions
objet petit a ←→ causal intervention
One can establish a few more connections, for instance
between Lacan’s concept of jouissance and the economic term
utility, but I hope that the aforementioned ones suffice to make
my case for now.
In summary, my claim is that Bayesian probability theory
is almost an axiomatic subjectivist theory; “almost” because
it lacks an analogue of the function performed by the objet
petit a, namely causal interventions, which is crucial to fully
characterise the subject. This will be the goal of the next
section.
IV. CAUSALITY AND THE ABSTRACT SUBJECT
Thus, Bayesian probability theory can be taken as a math-
ematical theory of the subject that passively draws logical
and probabilistic inferences from experience. To extend it to
interactive subjects, i.e. subjects that can shape the course
of realisation of a randomised experiment, it is necessary to
4introduce additional formal machinery. Due to space limita-
tions, the thorough analysis of these requirements is deferred
to Appendix A, and the resulting synthesis into a measure-
theoretic model of the interactive subject is presented in
Appendix B. My goal here is to give an informal summary
of the main ideas and results found therein.
A. Causality
Causality has always been one of the central aspects of
human explanation, with its first philosophical discussion
dating back to Aristotle’s Physics roughly some 2500 years
ago. In spite of this, it has not received much attention from
the scientific community, partly due to the strong scepticism
expressed by Hume (1748) and later by prominent figures in
statistics (Pearson et al., 1899) and logic (Russell, 1913). It
is only in the recent decades that philosophers and computer
scientists have attempted to characterise causal knowledge
in a rigorous way (Suppes, 1970; Salmon, 1980; Rubin,
1974; Cartwright, 1983; Spirtes and Scheines, 2001; Pearl,
2009; Woodward, 2013; Shafer, 1996; Dawid, 2007). I refer
the reader to Dawid (2010) for a mathematical, and Illari
and Russo (2014) for a thorough philosophical comparison
between existing approaches.
Arguably, one of the central contributions has been Pearl’s
characterisation of causal interventions (Pearl, 1993, 2009),
which in turn draws ideas from Simon (1977) and Spirtes
and Scheines (2001). Informally, a causal intervention is
conceived as a manipulation of the probability law of a random
experiment that functions by holding the value of a chosen
random variable fixed. The operation has been formalised
in causal directed acyclic graphs (DAGs); structural models
(Pearl, 2009); chain graphs (Lauritzen and Richardson, 2002);
influence diagrams (Dawid, 2007) and decision problems
(Dawid, 2015), to mention some. Another approach that is
worth pointing out is that of Shafer (1996). Therein, Shafer
shows that simple probability trees are able to capture very
rich causal structures, although he does not define causal
interventions on them. While the aforementioned definitions
differ in their scope, interpretation, and degree of complexity,
ultimately they entail transformations on probability measures
that are mathematically consistent with each other.
B. Causality in Games with Imperfect Information
Interestingly though, one the earliest and most general
formalisations of what much later became known as causal
interventions comes from game theory. More precisely, the
characteristics underlying modern causal interventions feature
implicitly in the representation of extensive-form games with
imperfect information (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944;
Osborne and Rubinstein, 1999). This connection is straightfor-
ward but, rather surprisingly, rarely acknowledged in the liter-
ature. The game-theoretic Ansatz yields an elegant definition
that can express a rich set of causal dependencies, including
higher-order ones. Conceptually, the approach is similar to
defining Pearl-type interventions on Shafer’s probability trees,
and it lends itself to a measure-theoretic formalisation.
In this set-up, the subject interprets her experience as a
sequential game between two players named I and W standing
for the I and the Other (i.e. the World) respectively4—that is,
player I’s moves are the subject’s actions, while W’s moves are
the subject’s observations. The structure of the game embodies
the causal narrative of the randomised experiment. Crucially,
player W’s otherness is expressed by a special ability: it can
play secret moves that I knows about but cannot see5. As
a consequence, causal assumptions manifest themselves as
independence relations that strictly limit player I’s knowledge
about player W’s moves. The missing information has the
effect of rendering some states in this game indistinguishable
from each other in the eyes of player I6. In contrast, player W
is omniscient, being able to see all the moves in the game.
To further clarify the peculiarities of this rather unusual set-
up, it is helpful to make an analogy to dreams. In many of
them, it is often the case that we encounter other people to
whom we talk. These conversations can be vivid and—most
importantly—surprising. Yet, how come we cannot anticipate
what others will say, given that these dreams are entirely
orchestrated by our own imagination? Somehow, our dreams
go to great lengths to maintain this stable illusion of otherness
of the people and the world by hiding their motives and reasons
from us. That is, our imagination draws a demarcation line
between the things done by ourselves (which do not surprise
us) and the things done by others (which feel external and
novel). To Lacan, this is no different when we are awake. The
imaginary register is responsible for maintaining this illusion
of the self and the world (players I and W respectively), and it
does so within the confines of our language (i.e. the symbolic,
providing the rules of the game).
From a syntactic point of view, perhaps the two most
important findings of the analysis in Appendix A are that,
firstly, an interactive subject must distinguish between her
actions and observations because they entail different belief
updates, and secondly, that in order to do so, the subject must
differentiate between an event (i.e. a logical proposition about
the experiment) and a realisation (i.e. a possible state of the
experiment). I refer the reader to Appendix A for the details
of this argument.
C. Representation of Causal Dependencies
To illustrate the set-up, consider the following classical
example (with a twist), consisting of two random variables W
and B representing the weather and the atmospheric pressure
as measured by a mercury barometer. To simplify, assume that
both W and B are binary, taking values inW = {sunny, rainy}
and B = {low, high} respectively. From elementary physics,
we know that the pairs (sunny, low) and (rainy, high) are more
likely than (sunny, high) and (rainy, low).
Our subject (e.g. an extraterrestrial visitor) does not know
whether the weather controls the barometer’s mercury col-
umn or the other way around. Using the language of causal
4Multiple “Others” are folded into a single player W.
5Game theory here subtly assumes that players have a theory of mind, that
is to say, the presumption that other players possess private information or
inaccessible “mental” states that direct their behaviour.
6In game-theoretic jargon, these states form so-called information sets.
5DAGs, this situation can be represented as one where the
subject ponders the plausibility of the two competing causal
hypotheses, say H = 1 and H = 2, depicted in Fig. 2a,
and the subject is challenged to induce one from experience.
Crucially though, while each hypothesis can be represented as
a separate graphical model, the causal dependencies governing
the induction problem itself cannot be cast into a single causal
DAG. Since the direction of the arc between W and B is
unknown, the subject has to treat H as a latent variable that
has to be inferred. Thus, we can tie the two hypotheses into
a single diagram by adding a node for the latent variable as
shown in Fig. 2b. However, the new diagram is not a causal
DAG any more. Most importantly, the theory of causal DAGs
does not specify how to do inference on this type of graph7
(Ortega, 2011).
W WB B
H = 1 H = 2
W B
H
a)
b)
Fig. 2. Combination of causal hypotheses.
In contrast, this situation has a natural representation as
a probability tree. This is because a probability tree allows
specifying causal dependencies that are dynamically instanti-
ated as a result of previous events. We first observe that the
hypothesis H causally precedes the weather W and the height
of the mercury column B, as H determines the very causal
order of W and B. The resulting probability tree is depicted in
Fig. 3. The semantics in a probability tree are self-explanatory:
nodes represent the potential states of realisation of the random
experiment, and the arrows indicate the possible transitions
between them, which are taken with the probabilities indicated
in the transition labels. Importantly, the arrows encode causal
dependencies, in that they specify the order in which the
intermediate states of the experiment are determined. Hence,
a path starting at the root and ending in a leaf corresponds to
a full realisation of the random experiment. The probability
of a particular realisation (indicated by a bold number below
the leaf) is obtained by multiplying the probabilities of all the
transitions taken.
The probability tree in Fig. 3 also shows that the subject
holds uniform prior beliefs P(H) = 1/2 over the two hypothe-
ses as encoded by the two transitions at the root node. This
inclusion of subjective probabilities is possible because we
commit to a fully Bayesian interpretation of the probabilities
in the tree. Finally, note that the left and right subtrees from the
7Note that this problem persists when using the language of structural
equations (Pearl, 2009), as the hypothesis H controls whether to include either
the structural equation B = g(W,U) or W = h(B,V) into the model, but at
the same time, inferences are only defined once all the structural equations
of the system are in place.
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Fig. 3. Probability tree for the induction problem.
root node encode both a causal order and a likelihood function.
In particular, the likelihood function P(W, B|H) is identical for
both causal hypotheses, and consequently there is no way to
distinguish between them through purely observational data—
that is, in a game where every single move is decided by
player W.
Formally, a probability tree can be characterised through a
causal space consisting of: a sample space; a collection of
privileged nested events called the set of realisations; and a
causal probability measure assigning transition probabilities
(precise definitions are provided in Appendix B). Such a causal
space contains enough information to generate the σ-algebra
and the probability measure of a classical probability space.
For instance, Fig. 4 illustrates a causal space suitable for
modelling the probability tree of Fig. 3, where the states of re-
alisation of the experiment have been labelled S0, S1, . . . , S15.
S0
1/2 1/2
1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
3/4 1/4 1/4 3/4 3/4 1/4 1/4 3/4
S1 S2
S6S5S4S3
S7 S8 S9 S10 S12 S13 S14 S15
Fig. 4. Causal space of the induction problem.
D. Actions and Observations
As mentioned previously, actions and observations cor-
respond to moves taken by players I and W respectively.
During the course of the game, the subject keeps track of the
probabilistic state of knowledge as seen from the perspective
of player I. In particular, the moves of player I cannot depend
on information that is private to player W.
6a) Observations: First, suppose that the subject makes
her first interaction by observing that the barometer’s mercury
column has fallen to a low value, i.e. B = low. This can happen
under three possible moves by player W, namely S3 → S7,
S4 → S9, and S2 → S5. The observation allows the subject
to rule out all the realisations of the experiment that take any
of the incompatible transitions S3 → S8, S4 → S10 or S2 →
S6. Each one of the three compatible transitions postulates
an alternative underlying state of the game. For instance, the
move S3 → S7 presumes that player W had secretly played
the moves S0 → S1 and S1 → S3 before eventually revealing
the last move to player I. However, since the latent state of the
game is unknown to player I, the subject updates her beliefs
by conditioning on B = low. Using Bayes’ rule, the posterior
probability of the causal hypothesis H = 1 is equal to
P(H = 1|B = low) = P(B = low|H = 1)P(H = 1)∑
h P(B = low|H = h)P(H = h)
=
1
2
,
where the likelihood P(B = low|H = 1) is calculated by
marginalising over the weather∑
w
P(W = w|H = 1)P(B = low|H = 1,W = w) = 1
2
,
and where P(B = low|H = 2) = 1/2 is as specified in the
transition S2 → S5. The posterior probability of the causal
hypothesis H = 2 can then be obtained through the sum rule
of probabilities:
P(H = 2|B = low) = 1− P(H = 1|B = low) = 1
2
.
Since P(H|B=low) = P(H), the observation of the barometer
does not provide the subject with evidence favouring any of
the two causal hypotheses.
b) Actions: Second, assume that the subject acts by
setting the value B = low herself instead. In this case, it is
player I that makes one of the three aforementioned moves
rather than player W. But, as is seen in Fig. 4, these moves
possess different probabilities. In order to draw the action
according to the prescribed odds, player I would have to know
the underlying state of the game. Given that this is not the case,
the subject must correct the probabilities of the randomised
experiment before conditioning on B = low to account for
player I’s ignorance. Technically, this correction is done as
follows:
i. Critical Bifurcations. The subject identifies all the states
of realisation having at least one transition leading to any
compatible state and at least one transition leading only
to incompatible states. These states are called critical
bifurcations. In the case of setting B = low, the critical
bifurcations are given by the states S2, S3, and S4.
ii. Transition Probabilities. For each critical bifurcation,
the subject assigns zero probability to every transition
leading only to incompatible states, thereafter renormal-
ising the remaining transitions. Fig. 5 shows the resulting
causal space.
This operation is analogous to Pearl’s notion of causal inter-
vention, and the reader can find its mathematically rigorous
definition in Appendix B. From a conceptual point of view
however, Pearl’s motivation was to characterize the notion of
manipulation, while here it arises as an accounting device for
hiding information from player I.
After this correction has been made, a new causal probabil-
ity measure PB=low is obtained, and the subject can condition
her beliefs on B = low as if it were a normal observation. Note
that PB=low preserves all the transition probabilities of P save
for the intervened ones.
Thus, the posterior probability of the causal hypothesis
H = 1 given that player I set B = low is equal to
PB=low(H = 1|B = low)
=
PB=low(B = low|H = 1)PB=low(H = 1)∑
h PB=low(B = low|H = h)PB=low(H = h)
=
1
2
,
where, similarly to the observational case, the likelihood
PB=low(B = low|H = 1) is calculated by marginalising over
the weather, but now relative to the intervened distribution∑
w
PB=low(W = w|H = 1)PB=low(B = low|H = 1,W = w) = 1,
and where the likelihood of the second hypothesis is
PB=low(B = low|H = 2) = 1.
S0
1/2 1/2
1/2 1/2 1 0
1 0 1 0 3/4 1/4 1/4 3/4
S1 S2
S6S5S4S3
S7 S8 S9 S10 S12 S13 S14 S15
Fig. 5. Causal space after intervention.
Fig. 6 schematically illustrates the difference between the
previous action and observation in terms of how the probability
mass is adjusted during each belief update. Each rectangle
illustrates the nested arrangement of the states of realisation
(vertical axis) and their corresponding probability masses
(horizontal axis). Belief updates are carried out in two steps:
elimination of the incompatible probability mass and a subse-
quent renormalisation.
E. Posterior
We now conclude our example by calculating the posterior
distribution over the two causal hypotheses. Note that both
belief updates leave the posterior distribution unchanged, i.e.
P(H|B = low) = PB=low(H|B = low) = P(H),
but they do so for different reasons: in the case of the obser-
vation, because the two causal hypotheses are observationally
indistinguishable; and in the case of the action, because the
choice of the hypothesis H precedes the barometer reading B.
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Fig. 6. Observations versus interventions.
Indeed, assume that the subject subsequently sees that the
weather is rainy. Following an analogous calculation as before,
it can be shown that
P(H = 1|B = low,W = rainy) = 1
2
,
for the purely observational case, and
PB=low(H = 1|B = low,W = rainy) = 2
3
,
for the intervened case. Thus, the subject, by virtue of her
action, can render the two causal hypotheses observationally
distinguishable, entitling her to conclude that it is more likely
that the weather controls the barometer just by looking at the
weather. However, she does not rule out the alternative.
V. DISCUSSION
A. Causal Spaces
The model of the subject advocated here is in no way
intended to be a replacement for existing causal frameworks.
Rather, it aims at providing a common abstract ground con-
taining a minimal set of primitives to reason about general
causal interventions. This was achieved by supplying the σ-
algebra of standard probability theory with a set of realisations
encoding the causal dependencies governing its events.
The model detailed in Appendix B is limited to countable
sets of realisations. This was chosen so as to ensure that the σ-
algebras generated by realisation sets are always well defined
(e.g. do not have excessive cardinalities). Furthermore, the
axioms guarantee that causal interventions are always well
defined for any given event.
B. Dynamic Instantiation of Causes
Causal spaces can express causal dependencies that are
instantiated dynamically, that is to say, causes that only come
into force under suitable higher-order causal conditions. Not
only are these dynamic causes ubiquitous in Nature and society
(e.g genes that regulate the relation between other genes;
smoking causing cancer leads governments to restrict tobacco;
etc.), but also they are necessary to represent causal induction
problems (see previous section).
C. Roˆle of Interventions
To stress the importance of the function performed by causal
interventions we can compare it to a mechanism found in the
human immune system. The physical distinction between us
and our surrounding seems obvious to us (e.g. we speak of
our body) but from a biomolecular point of view it is far from
clear where these boundaries are. Much to the contrary: these
boundaries must be actively maintained by antibodies, which
identify and sometimes neutralise antigens (i.e. foreign bodies,
such as bacteria and viruses) for their subsequent removal by
other parts of the immune system.
Similarly, causal interventions tag those events that are
attributed to the subject’s self to distinguish them from those
generated by the world. Without them, the subject would be
devoid of the psychological apparatus that gives her a sense
of unity and agency, and she would experience her life as a
“film with no recognizable protagonist” that she could identity
herself with.
D. What is an Action?
Classical decision theory assumes from the outset that there
is a clear-cut distinction between action and observation vari-
ables (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; Savage, 1954).
Similarly, control theory and artificial intelligence take this
distinction as a given. Indeed, artificial intelligence textbooks
describe an agent as any system possessing sensors and
effectors (Russell and Norvig, 2009).
In contrast, the idea of the subject as a construct plus
the line of thought developed here suggest a different story.
Whenever the subject sees an event as emanating from herself,
she tags it through a causal intervention. However, every causal
intervention changes her beliefs in an irreversible manner. For
instance, consider the subject’s choice probabilities of fixing
the value of the barometer herself from the induction example.
These were equal to
P(B = low) =
1
2
and P(B = high) =
1
2
before the intervention, and
PB=low(B = low) = 1 and PB=low(B = high) = 0
immediately thereafter but prior to conditioning her beliefs
on B = low. In other words, she went from being completely
undecided to being absolutely convinced that this had been
her choice all along8. Plus, the new probabilibity measure
PB=low does not possess enough information to recover the
original probability measure P, yet it does contain the traces
left by the intervention in the form of independences from
the causal precedents. Accordingly, a random variable can be
identified as an action if it can be thought of as the result of a
causal intervention. But then again, how can she tell that the
independences in PB=low were not already there from before
the supposed intervention?
These observations raise the following basic open questions:
8Also, refer to the discussion in Appendix A-C.
81) What is the criterion employed by the subject to decide
whether to treat an event as an action or an observation?
To what extent is this arbitrary?
2) Does this criterion have to be learned in the form of an
hypothesis in the Bayesian sense?
3) Does a subject gain anything from distinguishing be-
tween herself and the world?
Indeed, if the subject wanted to learn what her actions and
observations are, then the only way she can classify a random
variable unambiguously, as is the case in classical decision
theory, is when she has no hypothesis offering a competing
explanation.
This also sheds more light into the connection between
causal interventions and Lacan’s objet petit a9. An action turns
out to be a random variable of somewhat contradictory nature:
because on one hand, it is statistically independent and hence,
subjectivised; but on the other hand, it is still generated by the
external world, namely, by the very decision processes of the
subject that are not under its direct control, e.g. following a
utility-maximising agenda. Lacan’s term objet petit a can thus
be regarded as a play of words that encapsulates this dual
nature (Fink, 1996).
E. Concluding Remarks
There are numerous reasons why I chose to compare
Bayesian probability theory to Lacanian theory. It is true that,
virtually since its inception, psychoanalytic theories have al-
ways faced fierce opposition that has questioned their status as
a scientific discipline (see e.g. Popper, 1934; Feynman et al.,
1964). While their efficacy as a treatment of mental illnesses
is undoubtedly controversial (Tallis, 1996), cultural studies
have embraced psychoanalytic theories as effective conceptual
frameworks to structure the discourse about subjectivity in
a metaphysically frugal fashion. As a researcher in artificial
intelligence, the greatest value I see in the psychoanalytic
theories is in that they epitomise the contingent cultural
assumptions about subjectivity of modern Western thinking,
summarising ideas that otherwise would require a prohibitive
literature research.
Finally, I would like to stress that, while here my motivation
was to advance a mathematical definition of subjectivity (in
Bayesian terms), the resulting axiomatic system is agnostic
about its interpretation. The reader can verify that many of the
existing philosophical views are indeed compatible with the
mathematical formalisation presented here (Illari and Russo,
2014), and that some of the philosophical interpretations are
not unrelated to the psychoanalytic interpretation (e.g. the
idea of agency probabilities put forward by Menzies and
Price (1993) and the epistemic interpretation of causality of
Williamson (2009)).
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APPENDIX A
PROBABILISTIC CAUSALITY
A. Evidential versus Generative Probabilities
One of the features of modern probability theory is that a
probability space (Ω,F ,P) can be used in two ways, which
we may label as evidential and generative. The evidential
use conceives a probability space as a representation of an
experimenter’s knowledge about the conclusions he can draw
when he is provided with measurements performed on the out-
comes; while the generative usage sees the probability space
as a faithful characterisation of the experiment’s stochastic
mechanisms that bring about observable quantities. Thus, a
statistician or a philosopher can use probabilities to asses the
plausibility of hypotheses, while an engineer or a physicist
typically uses them to characterise the propensity of an event,
often assuming that these propensities are objective, physical
properties thereof.
In a Bayesian interpretation, evidential and generative refer
to subject’s observations/measurements and actions/choices re-
spectively. Under the evidential usage of probabilities, the sub-
ject passively contemplates the measurements of phenomena
generated by the world. A measurement reveals to the subject
which possible worlds she can discard from her knowledge
state. In contrast, under the generative usage of probabilities,
the subject is the random process itself. Thus, outcomes are
chosen randomly by the subject and then communicated to
the world. While there are many cases where this distinction
does not play a roˆle, if we aim at characterising a subject that
both passively observes and actively chooses, this distinction
becomes crucial.
Our running example consists of a three-stage experiment
involving two identical urns: urn A containing one white and
three black balls, and urn B having three white and one
black ball. In stage one, the two urns are either swapped or
not with uniform probabilities. In stage two it is randomly
decided whether to exclude the left or the right urn from the
experiment. If the urns have not been swapped in the first
stage, then the odds are 3/4 and 1/4 for keeping the left and
the right urn respectively. If the urns have been swapped, then
the odds are reversed. In the third and last stage, a ball is
drawn from the urn with equal probabilities and its colour
is revealed. We associate each stage with a binary random
9variable: namely Swap ∈ {yes, no}, Pick ∈ {left, right} and
Colour ∈ {white, black} respectively. Figure 7 illustrates the
set-up. In calculations, I will sometimes abbreviate variable
names and their values with their first letters. We will now
consider several interaction protocols between two players
named I and W, representing the outward and inward flow
of a subject respectively as detailed in Section III.
1/2 1/2
3/4 1/4 1/4 3/4
3/4 1/4 1/4 3/4 1/4 3/4 3/4 1/4
Fig. 7. A three-stage randomised experiment.
1) Generative: In the generative case, I carries out the
three steps of the experiment, possibly consulting auxiliary
randomising devices like tosses of fair coins. In each step,
I makes a random choice; that is, it selects a value for
the corresponding random variable following a prescribed
probability law that depends on the previous choices. For
instance, the odds of “drawing a black ball” given that “the
urns have been swapped in the first stage and the right urn has
been picked in the second stage” is 3/4.
The probabilities governing I’s behaviour are formalised
with a probability space S := (Ω,F ,P), where Ω1 contains
the eight possible outcomes, σ-algebra is the powerset F =
P(Ω1), and P is the probability measure that is consistent
with the conditional probabilities in Figure 7. Table II lists
the eight outcomes and their probabilities.
TABLE II
OUTCOME PROBABILITIES IN PROBABILITY SPACE S
Swap Pick Colour Probability
no left black 9/32
no left white 3/32
no right black 1/32
no right white 3/32
yes left black 1/32
yes left white 3/32
yes right black 9/32
yes right white 3/32
The information contained in the probability space does not
enforce a particular sequential plan to generate the outcome.
The story of the experiment tells us that Swap, Pick, and
Colour are chosen in this order. However, I can construct other
sequential plans to generate the outcome. For example, I could
first choose the value of Colour, then Swap, and finally Pick
(possibly having to change the underlying story about urns and
balls), following probabilities that are in perfect accordance
with the generative law specified by the probability space.
2) Evidential: In this case, player I, knowing about the
probability law governing the experiment, passively observes
its realisation as chosen by W. In each step, it makes a
measurement; that is, I obtains the value of a random variable
and uses it to update its beliefs about the state of the outcome.
For instance, the plausibility of “the ball is black” given that
“the urns have been swapped in the first stage and the right
urn has been picked in the second stage” is 3/4.
Here again, the probabilities governing I’s beliefs are for-
malised by the same probability space S. Analogously to
the generative case, it does not matter in which order the
information about the outcome is revealed to I: for instance,
P(Colour|Swap, Pick) is the same no matter whether it ob-
serves the value of Swap or Pick first.
B. Mixing Generative and Evidential
Let us change the experimental paradigm. Instead of let-
ting W choosing and I passively observing, we now let both
determine the outcome, taking turns in steering the course
of the experiment depicted in Figure 7. In the first stage, W
chooses between swapping the urns or not; in stage two, I
decides randomly whether to keep the left or the right urn;
and in the last stage, W draws a ball from the remaining urn.
The protocol is summarised in Table III. We will investigate
two experimental conditions.
TABLE III
PROTOCOL FOR THE EXPERIMENT
Stage Variable Chosen by
1 Swap W
2 Pick I
3 Colour W
1) Perfect Information.: Under the first condition, both
players are fully aware of all the previous choices. At any
stage, the player-in-turn makes a decision following the con-
ditional probability table that is consistent with past choices.
It is easy to see that, again, the probability space S serves
as a characterisation of the subject: although this time the
conditional probabilities stand for I’s beliefs (first and last
stage) and I’s behaviour (second stage). Essentially, the fact
that we now have interactions between I and W can still
be dealt with under the familiar analytical framework of
probability theory. Note that, as in the previous two cases, we
can suggest changes to the sequential order; furthermore, we
can swap the players’ roˆles without changing our calculations.
2) Imperfect Information: The second experimental regime
is identical to the previous one with one exception: W carries
out the first stage of the experiment secretly, without telling
I whether the urns were swapped or not. Hence, for I, the
statements “Swap = yes” and “Swap = no” are equiprobable
(e.g. the urns are opaque, see Fig. 8). How should I choose in
this case? Let us explore two attempts.
The first attempt consists in postulating that the two ex-
perimental regimes (perfect and imperfect information) are
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Fig. 8. Transparent versus opaque.
decoupled and hence require case-based probability specifica-
tions. Concretely, P(Pick|Swap = yes), P(Pick|Swap = no)
and P(Pick) are unrelated probability distributions and are
therefore freely specifiable. While this is a possible solution,
it has the drawback that the resulting belief model violates the
probability axioms, since in general the equation
P(P) 6=
∑
S = y, n
P(P|S)P(S)
does not hold for tuples of conditional probability distribu-
tions.
The second attempt enlarges the model as follows. We add
an auxiliary binary variable, say KnowsSwap, that indicates
whether I is in possession of the value of variable Swap.
This allows specifying a total of four conditional probability
distributions of the form
P(Pick|Swap,KnowsSwap)
indexed by the joint settings of Swap and KnowsSwap, where
the latter can be treated as another random variable or as
a conditional variable. However, this arrangement does not
fundamentally bypass the original problem: we can extend I’s
ignorance of the value of Swap to the value of KnowsSwap
as well. That is, although we have extended Pick’s functional
dependency from Swap to both Swap and KnowsSwap, there
is no reason why KnowsSwap should not be an undisclosed
variable too. Consequently, this would require introducing yet
another auxiliary variable, say KnowsKnowsSwap, to indicate
whether the value of KnowsSwap is known, and so forth,
piling up an infinite tower of indicator variables. Eventually,
one is left with the feeling that this second solution is
conceptually unsatisfactory as well.
Thus, let us continue with a solution that accepts I’s
ignorance of the value of the random variable Swap. The story
of the experiment tells us that the probabilities P(Pick|Swap)
have the semantics of conditional instructions for I; but since
the condition is unknown, the choice probabilities consistent
with this situation are obtained by marginalising over the
unknown information. More specifically, the probability of
picking the right urn is
P(P = r) =
∑
S = y,n
P(P = r|S)P(S),
which is thereby rendered independent of the unknown infor-
mation. For the particular numbers in our example, the choice
probabilities evaluate to a uniform distribution
P(P = r) =
3
4
· 1
2
+
1
4
· 1
2
=
1
2
, P(P = l) =
1
2
.
Interestingly, the resulting experiment does not follow the
same generative law as in the previous experimental condition
any more, for the odds of swapping the urns in the first stage
and picking the right urn in the second were 12 · 34 = 38 and
not 12 · 12 = 14 like in the current set-up. Thus, albeit I’s beliefs
are captured by the probability space S = (Ω,F ,P), the
outcomes of this new experiment follow a different generative
law, described by a probability triple S′ := (Ω,F ,P′), where
P′ 6= P is determined by the probabilities listed in Table IV.
The choice made by I actually changed the probability law of
the experiment!
TABLE IV
OUTCOME PROBABILITIES IN PROBABILITY SPACE S′ .
Swap Pick Colour Probability
no left black 3/16
no left white 1/16
no right black 1/16
no right white 3/16
yes left black 1/16
yes left white 3/16
yes right black 3/16
yes right white 1/16
A moment of thought reveals that this change happened
simply because I’s state of knowledge did not conform to
the functional requirements of the second random variable. At
first seemingly harmless, this change of the probability law
has far-reaching consequences for I’s state of knowledge: the
familiar operation of probabilistic conditioning does not yield
the correct belief update any more. To give a concrete example,
recall that the plausibility of the urns having been swapped in
the first stage before I picks the left urn in the second stage
is
P(S = y) =
1
2
.
However, after the choice, the probability is
P(S = y|P = l) = P(P = l|S = y)P(S = y)∑
S = y, n P(P = l|S)P(S)
=
1
4 · 12
1
4 · 12 + 34 · 12
=
1
4
.
Hence, if I wanted to use probabilistic conditioning to infer
the plausibility of the hypothesis, then it would conclude that
its choice actually created evidence regarding the first stage
of the experiment—a conclusion that violates common sense.
C. Causal Realisations
If we accept that probabilistic conditioning is not the correct
belief update in the context of generative probabilities then we
need to re-examine the nature of probabilistic choices.
The familiar way of conceptualising the realisation of a
random experiment (Ω,F ,P) is via the choice of a sample
ω ∈ Ω following the generative law specified by the prob-
ability measure P. Sequential observations are modelled as
sequential refinements (i.e. a filtration)
FI S−→ FII P−→ FIII C−→ F
of an initial, ignorant algebra FI = {Ω,∅} up to the most fine-
grained algebra F =P(Ω). The labels on the arrows indicate
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the particular random variable that has become observable (i.e.
measurable) in the refinement. A second, non-standard way in
the context of probability theory, is to think of a realisation as a
random transformation of an initial probability triple (Ω,F ,P)
into a final, degenerate probability triple (Ω,F ,Pω), where
Pω is the probability measure concentrating all its probability
mass on the singleton {ω} ∈ F . This alternative way of
accounting for random realisations will prove particularly
fruitful to formalise probabilistic choices.
In many situations it is natural to subdivide the realisation
of a complex experiment into a sequence of realisations of
simple sub-experiments. For instance, the realisation of the
experiment in the running example can be broken down into
a succession of three random choices, i.e. a sequence
P
fS−→ PI fP−→ PII fC−→ PIII,
of random transformations of the initial probability measure
P. Here, the three mappings fS, fP, and fC implement partic-
ular assignments for the values of Swap, Pick, and Colour
respectively, and PI, PII, and PIII are their corresponding
resulting probability measures. Together, fS, fP, and fC form
a sequential plan to specify a particular realisation {ω} ∈ F
of the experiment. However, the mathematical formalisation
of such decompositions requires further analysis.
Underlying any purely evidential usage of probabilities,
there is the implicit, although somewhat concealed, assumption
of a predetermined outcome: the choice of the outcome of the
experiment precedes the measurements performed on it10. In
other words, obtaining information about the outcome updates
the belief state of the subject, but not the outcome itself. In
contrast, the generative use assumes an undetermined, fluid
state of the outcome. More specifically, a choice updates
both the beliefs of the subject and the very state of the
realisation. Hence, there are two types of states that have to
be distinguished: the state of the beliefs and the state of the
realisation.
Distinguishing between the states of the realisation imposes
restrictions on how beliefs have to be updated after making
choices. These restrictions are probably best highlighted if one
imagines—just for illustrative purposes—that the experiment
is a physical system made up from a cascade of (stochas-
tic) mechanisms, where each mechanism is a sub-experiment
implementing a choice. Based on the physical metaphor, one
concludes that choices can only affect the odds of the states
of realisation that are downstream. So, for instance, picking
the left urn knowing that the urns were swapped in the first
stage increases the odds for drawing a white ball in the last
stage, but it cannot change the fact that the urns have been
swapped. Hence, the belief update following a choice affects
the beliefs about the future, but not about the past11.
Another aspect of choices is concerned with their scope,
which spans many potential realisations. Consider the second
stage of the experiment. As it can be seen from its illustration
10Here we recall the probabilistic mythology, in which it is Tyche, the
Goddess of Chance, who has the privilege of choosing the outcome.
11To be more precise, by the terms past and future I mean the causal
precedents and causal successors respectively.
3/4 1/4 1/4 3/4
Fig. 9. The second stage of the randomised experiment.
in Figure 9, this stage contains two parts, namely one for
each possible outcome of the first stage. In a sense, its
two constituents could be conceived as being actually two
stand-alone experiments deserving to be treated separately,
since they represent alternative, mutually exclusive historical
evolutions of the sequential experiment which were rendered
causally independent by the choice in the first stage. Thus,
picking an urn given that the urns were swapped in the first
stage could in principle have nothing to do with picking an urn
given that the urns were not swapped. However, this separation
requires knowing the choices in the execution of the sequential
experiment; a situation that failed to happen in our previous
example. To be more precise: the semantics of this grouping
is precisely that we have declared not being able to discern
between them. In game theory, this is called an information
set—see Appendix A-D later in the text.
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
Fig. 10. The two possible choices in the second stage.
Even though it is clear that the belief update for a choice
has to respect the causal boundaries separating the different
histories, a choice is an epistemic operation that affects all his-
tories in parallel because they are the same from the subject’s
point of view. Therefore, we formalise the sub-experiment in
Figure 9 as a collection of experiments admitting two choices,
namely fP=l and fP=r, representing the choice of the left and
right urn respectively. Suppose we are asked to choose the left
urn in this collection of experiments. This makes sense because
“choosing the left urn” is an operation that is well-defined
across all the members in the collection. Then, this choice
amounts to a transformation that puts all the probability mass
on both left urns. Analogously, “choosing the right urn” puts
all the probability mass on the right urns. The two choices,
fP=l and fP=r, are illustrated in Figure 10.
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Fig. 11. The three-stage randomised experiment after choosing the left urn
in the second stage.
Recall the situation where player I chose the left urn
without knowing whether the urns were swapped or not in
the first stage. From our previous discussion, this amounts
to applying fP=l to the sub-experiment in the second stage.
This leads to the modified three-stage experiment illustrated
in Figure 11 having a probability measure PP=l, where the
subscript informs us of the manipulation performed on the
original measure P. Similarly, if fP=r is applied, we obtain
the probability measure PP=r for the experiment. Table V
lists both probability measures plus the expected probability
measure E[PP] which averages over the two choices. Notice
that in Table IV, it is seen that E[PP] is equal to P′, i.e.
the probability law resulting from the experiment under the
condition of imperfect information.
TABLE V
PROBABILITIES OF THE EXPERIMENT AFTER THE CHOICE OF PICK.
Swap Pick Colour PP=L PP=R E[PP]
no left black 3/8 0 3/16
no left white 1/8 0 1/16
no right black 0 1/8 1/16
no right white 0 3/8 3/16
yes left black 1/8 0 1/16
yes left white 3/8 0 3/16
yes right black 0 3/8 3/16
yes right white 0 1/8 1/16
Finally, we calculate the plausibility of the urns having been
swapped after the left urn is chosen. This is given by
PP=l(S = y|P = l) = PP=l(P = l|S = y)PP=l(S = y)∑
s=y,n PP=l(P = l|S = s)PP=l(S = s)
=
1 · P(S = y)∑
s=y,n 1 · P(S = s)
=
1 · 12
1 · 12 + 1 · 12
=
1
2
.
Hence, according to the belief update for choices that we
have proposed in this section, choosing the left urn in the
second stage does not provide evidence about the first stage.
However, if a black ball is drawn right afterwards, the posterior
plausibility will be
PP=l(S = y|P = l,C = b)
=
PP=l(C = b|S = y,P = l)PP=l(S = y|P = l)∑
s=y,n PP=l(C = b|S = s,P = l)PP=l(S = s|P = l)
=
1
4 · 12
1
4 · 12 + 34 · 12
=
1
4
,
i.e. the subject obtains evidence favouring the hypothesis
that the urns were not swapped. This leads to an interesting
interpretation. In a sense, the intervention functions as a
psychological mechanism informing the subject that her choice
cannot be used as additional evidence to support hypotheses
about the past; the fundamental roˆle of the intervention is
to declare the choice as an unequivocal, deterministic con-
sequence of the subject’s state of knowledge at the moment
of the decision. Or, loosely speaking, the intervention “tricks
the subject into believing that her choice was deliberate, not
originating from an external source”—recall the discussion
about the objet petit a. As a consequence, a subject can never
learn from her own actions; rather, she only learns from their
effects.
D. Connection to Extensive-Form Games
Before concluding this section, we briefly review the rela-
tion between the causal interventions derived above and their
connection to extensive-form games. For the sake of brevity,
here I will adopt an informal exposition to elucidate the
connection of concern, referring the reader to the original text
by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, ch. 7) or the modern
text by Osborne and Rubinstein (1999, chs. 2, 6, and 11) for
a formal description.
In game theory, an extensive-form game is a specification
of a game between two or more players that can capture a
variety of aspects of the game mechanics, such as the order
and possible moves of the players, the information available to
them under each situation, their pay-offs, and chance moves.
The representation of such a game consists in a rooted game
tree, where each node is assigned to a player, and where the
edges leaving a node represent the possible moves that the
corresponding player can take in that node.
1,1 0,11,00,11,00,0 0,01,1
0
1 2
6543
Fig. 12. An extensive-form game with perfect information.
Fig. 12 illustrates a two-player game with three steps. The
internal nodes are coloured according to the player that takes
that move, and each terminal node is labelled with the pay-off
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for Black and White respectively. Here, notice that the best
strategy for Black consists in choosing left when in node 1,
and right when in node 2, as otherwise she would walk away
empty-handed, assuming that White makes moves to maximise
his own pay-offs.
1/2 1/2
3/4 1/4 1/4 3/4 1/4 3/4 3/4 1/4
1 01010 01
0
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Fig. 13. Replacing one player with chance moves.
We can bring chance elements into the game by replacing
one of the players with stochastic moves. In this case, White is
substituted with a stochastic strategy that is reminiscent of the
original optimal strategy (i.e. White now chooses a suboptimal
move with probability 1/4), like shown in Fig. 13. Notice that
once the strategy is settled, we can drop the pay-offs for White
from the description of the game. The new game with chance
moves for White has the same optimal strategy for Black as
the previous game.
The two previous games are known as games with perfect
information, because players know at all times what moves
were taken previously in the game. To model games where
players do not see one or more of the previous moves,
von Neumann introduced the concept of an information set.
An information set consists of a set of nodes belonging to
the same player, with the semantics that if any of them
is reached during the game, then the corresponding player
cannot distinguish between its members to make the next
move. Hence, the general description of an extensive-form
game requires specifying an partition of each player’s decision
nodes into information sets, and perfect information games are
special in that each player’s partition is just a collection of
singletons.
1/2 1/2
3/4 1/4 1/4 3/4 1/4 3/4 3/4 1/4
1 01010 01
0
1 2
6543
Fig. 14. Information sets.
Information sets are typically drawn as a loop around its
member nodes, and singleton sets are omitted for brevity.
Fig. 14 shows the new game obtained from lumping together
nodes 1 & 2. As a result, the previous optimal strategy for
Black in not valid any more, since it prescribes different
moves for the two nodes in the set. In contrast, the new
optimal strategy for Black must take into account that either
node is reached with the same probability. Indeed, under this
constraint on Black’s knowledge, it is easily seen that both
possible actions are rendered equally good.
It hard to overstate Von Neumann’s achievement. Clearly,
information sets play the roˆle of restricting the game dynamics
under causal constraints, i.e. players’ moves are interventions.
More precisely, once players pick their strategies, the resulting
sequential distribution over moves can be thought of as the
result of applying the type of causal interventions discussed
in the preceding parts of this section (see Fig. 15 for a
comparison with the associated causal DAG).
1/2 1/2
3/4 1/4 1/4 3/4 1/4 3/4 3/4 1/4
1 01010 01
0
1 2
6543
1 0 0 1
1/2 1/2
3/4 1/4 1/4 3/4 1/4 3/4 3/4 1/4
1 01010 01
0
1 2
6543
1 0 1 0
Fig. 15. The causal intervention is highlighted when comparing the game
dynamics before and after introducing the information sets of Black.
APPENDIX B
THE ABSTRACT SUBJECT
The aim of this section is to present an abstract model of
the subject. In particular, I have dedicated much effort into
elucidating the links to measure-theoretic probability, which
currently holds the status of providing the standard foundations
for abstract probability theory.
A. Realisations and Causal Spaces
First we introduce a structure that models the states of
realisation of a random experiment.
Definition 1 (Realisation). A set R of non-empty subsets of
Ω is called a set of realisations iff
R1. the sure event is a realisation:
Ω ∈ R;
R2. realisations form a tree:
for each distinct U, V ∈ R, either U ∩V = ∅ or U ⊂ V
or V ⊂ U ;
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R3. the tree is complete:
for each U, V ∈ R where V ⊂ U , there exists a
sequence (Vn)n∈N in R such that U \ V =
⋃
n Vn.
R4. every branch has a starting and an end point:
let (Vn)n∈N ∈ R be such that Vn ↑ V or Vn ↓ V . Then,
V ∈ R.
A member U ∈ R is called a realisation or a realisable event.
Given two realisations U, V ∈ R, we say that U precedes V iff
U ⊃ V . Given two subsets U ,V ⊂ R, we say that U precedes
V iff for every V ∈ V , there exists an element U ∈ U such
that U precedes V . Analogously, we also say that V follows
U iff U precedes V , and that V follows U iff U precedes V .
Finally, two realisations U, V ∈ R that neither precede nor
follow each other are said to be incomparable.
From axioms R1–R3, it is clearly seen that a set of realisa-
tions is essentially a tree of nested subsets of the sample space,
rooted at the sample space. Axiom R4 includes the upper
and lower limits of realisation sequences, thus constituting a
formalisation of the fourth postulate causal reasoning. One
important difference to standard σ-algebras is that the com-
plement is, in general, not in the algebra, the only exception
being the impossible realisation.
An immediate consequence of this definition is that the set
of realisations forms a partial order among its members. The
partial order is the fundamental requirement for modelling
causal dependencies.
Proposition 2. [Partial Order] A set of realisations R en-
dowed with the set inclusion ⊂ forms a partial order.
Proof: Trivial, because it is inherited from (P(Ω),⊂): it
is reflexive, since for each U ∈ R, U ⊂ U ; it is antisymmetric,
since for each U, V ∈ R, if U ⊂ V and V ⊂ U then U = V ;
and it is transitive, because for all U, V,W ∈ R, if W ⊂ V
and V ⊂ U then W ⊂ U .
The intuition here is that “U ⊃ V ” corresponds to the
intuitive notion of “V depends causally on U”, i.e. the veracity
of V can only be determined insofar U is known to have
obtained; and “U ∩V = ∅” means that “V and U are causally
independent”.
A set of realisations can be visualised as a tree of nested
sets. For instance, Fig. 16 is a possible set of realisations for
the experiment in Fig. 7. Here, the sure event Ω at the root is
partitioned recursively into branches until reaching the leaves
representing the termination of the experiment.
{1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9}
{5,6,7,8,9}{1,2,3,4}
{1,2} {3,4} {5,6,7} {8,9}
{1} {2} {3} {4} {5,6} {7} {8} {9}
Fig. 16. A realisation set for the experiment.
Next we define an important class of events of the experi-
ment, namely those that can be thought of as a union of causal
histories that are potentially incompatible.
Definition 3 (Representation). A subset A ⊂ Ω is said to have
a representation inR iff there exists a sequence (An)n∈N inR
such that
⋃
nAn = A. The set of representable events r(R) is
the collection of all the subsets of Ω that have a representation
in R.
For instance, consider the subsets
A1 = {2, 5, 6}, A2 = {3, 4} and A3 = {4, 5}.
A1 has a unique representation given by A1 = {{2}, {5, 6}};
A2 has two representations, namely A2 = {{3}, {4}} and
A′2 = {{3, 4}}; and A3 does not have a representation.
It turns out that the set of representable events has a fun-
damental property: it coincides with the σ-algebra generated
by R. This means that every event of the experiment can
be thought of as corresponding to a collection of possibly
mutually exclusive realisations.
Theorem 4 (Representation). Let R be a set of realisations,
let r(R) be the set of representable events in R and let σ(R)
be the σ-algebra generated by R. Then, r(R) = σ(R).
Proof: Case r(R) ⊂ σ(R): This follows directly from
the definition of a σ-algebra. Case r(R) ⊃ σ(R): We prove
this by induction. For the base case, let (Vn)nN be a sequence
in R. Then, V = ⋃n Vn ∈ σ(R) has a representation in R.
Furthermore, V ∈ R implies that there exists (Vn)n∈N in R
such that Ω \ V = ⋃n Vn (Axiom R3). Hence, V c ∈ σ(R)
too has a representation in R. For the induction case, assume
we have a sequence (An)n∈N with representations (An)n∈N
respectively, where An = (Vn,m)m∈N for each n ∈ N. Then,⋃
n
An =
⋃
n
⋃
m
Vn,m =
⋃
l
Vl,
where l ∈ N is a diagonal enumeration of the (n,m) ∈ N×N.
Obviously, (Vl)l∈N is a representation for
⋃
nAn ∈ σ(R).
Now, assume that A ∈ σ(A) has a representation (An)n∈N.
Then,
Ac =
(⋃
n
An
)c
=
⋂
n
Acn.
Since the An are in R, their complements Acn have represen-
tations (Vn,m)m∈N. Hence,
Ac =
⋂
n
Acn =
⋂
n
⋃
m
Vn,m =
⋃
f :N→N
⋂
n
Vn,f(n),
where the last equality holds due to the extensionality property
of sets. More specifically, for ω ∈ Ω to be a member of the
l.h.s., there must be an m for each n such that ω ∈ Vn,m. This
is true in particular for the map f that chooses the smallest m
for each n. Hence, ω is a member of the r.h.s. Now, consider
an element ω ∈ Ω that is not in the l.h.s. Then, there exists
some n such that ω /∈ Vn,m for all m. Since, for this particular
n, this is false for any choice of f in the r.h.s., ω is not a
member of the r.h.s., which proves the equality. Finally, since
intersections of members Vn,m of R are either equal to ∅ or
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equal to a member Vl of R (Axiom R2), one has Ac =
⋃
l Vl
for some (Vl)l∈N, which is a representation of Ac.
Having defined the basic structure of realisations, we now
place probabilities on them. However, rather than working
with the standard (unconditional) probability measure P that
is customary in measure-theory, here—as is also the case in
Bayesian probability theory (Cox, 1961; Jaynes and Bretthorst,
2003)—it is much more natural to work directly with a
conditional probability measure P(·|·). One way to establish
the connection to the standard measure-theoretic view consists
in thinking of the conditional probability measure as a function
such that P(A|Ω) := P(A) and P(A|U) := P(A ∩ U)/P(U)
whenever U ∈ R is such that P(U) > 0. Henceforth, we
will drop the qualifier “conditional”, and just talk about the
“probability measure” P (·|·).
Definition 5 (Causal Measure). Given a set of realisationsR, a
causal measure is a binary set function P(·|·) : R×R → [0, 1],
such that
C1. the past is certain:
For any V,U ∈ R, if U precedes V , then
P(U |V ) = 1;
C2. incomparable realisations are impossible:
For any incomparable V,U ∈ R,
P(V |U) = 0;
C3. sum-rule:
For any U ∈ R and any disjoint sequence (Vn)n∈N such
that Vn follows U for all n ∈ N and
⋃
n∈N Vn = U ,∑
n∈N
P(Vn|U) = 1;
C4. product-rule:
For any U, V,W ∈ R such that W follows V and V
follows U ,
P(W |U) = P(W |V ) · P(V |U).
Thus, a causal measure is defined only over R×R, provid-
ing a supporting skeleton for the construction of a full-fledged
probability measure extending over the entire σ-algebra. A
simple way of visually representing a causal measure is by
indicating the transition probabilities in the corresponding tree
diagram, as illustrated in Fig. 17. In the figure, the sets have
been replaced with labels, e.g. S0 = Ω and S4 = {3, 4}.
Definition 6 (Compatible Probability Measure). Given a
causal measure P over a set of realisations R, a probability
measure P′(·|·) : σ(R) × σ(R) → [0, 1] is said to be
compatible with P iff P′ = P on R×R.
It turns out that the causal measure almost completely
determines its compatible probability measures, the exception
being the probabilities conditioned on events that are not
realisations. To show this, we first introduce a definition.
Definition 7 (RU , ΣU ). Let R be a set of realisations. For
any given U , define RU := U ∩R and ΣU := U ∩ σ(R).
S0
1/2 1/2
3/4 1/4 1/4 3/4
3/4 1/4 1/4 3/4 1/4 3/4 3/4 1/4
S1 S2
S6S5S4S3
S7 S8 S9 S10 S12 S13 S14 S15
Fig. 17. A causal space for the experiment.
Observe that RU is a set of realisations based on U as
the sample space. Furthermore, it is well-known (Ash and
Dole´ans-Dade, 1999, Chapter 1.2) that
ΣU = U ∩ σ(R) = σU (U ∩R)
where σU (U ∩R) is the σ-algebra generated by subsets of U ,
i.e. where U rather than Ω is taken as the sample space. The
aforementioned uniqueness result follows.
Proposition 8. Let P1 and P2 be two probability measures
that are compatible with a causal measure P over R. Then,
for each U ∈ R, V ∈ ΣU , P1(V |U) = P2(V |U).
Proof: First we note that each RU is a pi-system, i.e. a
family of subsets of U that is stable under finite intersection:
U, V ∈ RU implies U ∩ V ∈ RU . This is because, for any
U ∈ RU , U ∩ U ∈ RU ; and for all distinct U, V ∈ RU ,
either U ∩ V = ∅ or U ⊂ V or V ⊂ U implies that either
U ∩ V = ∅ = U \ U or U ∩ V = U or V ∩ U = V , which
are all members of RU .
Next we prove that for each U ∈ R, V ∈ ΣU , P1(V |U) =
P2(V |U). Lemma 1.6. in Williams (1991) states that, if two
probability measures agree on a pi-system, then they also agree
on the σ-algebra generated by the pi-system. Pick any U ∈
R. Applying the lemma, we conclude that for all V ∈ ΣU ,
P1(V |U) = P2(V |U). Since U ∈ R is arbitrary, the statement
of the proposition is proven.
Given the previous definition, we are ready to define our
main object: the causal space. A causal space, like a standard
probability space, serves the purpose of characterising a ran-
dom experiment, but with the important difference that it also
contains information about the causal dependencies among the
events of the experiment.
Definition 9 (Causal Space). A causal space is a tuple
C = (Ω,R,P), where Ω is a set of outcomes, R is a set
of realisations on Ω, and P is a causal measure over R.
Intuitively, it is clear that a causal space contains enough
information to characterise probability spaces that represent
the same experiment. These probability spaces are defined as
follows.
Definition 10 (Compatible Probability Space). Given a causal
space C = (Ω,R,P), a probability space S = (Ω,F ,P′)
is said to be compatible with C if F = σ(R) and P′ is
compatible with P.
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An immediate consequence of the previous results is that
compatible probability spaces are essentially unique.
Corollary 11. Let S1 = (Ω,F1,P1) and S2 = (Ω,F2,P2) be
two probability spaces compatible with a given causal space
C = (Ω,R,P). Then,
1) their σ-algebras are equal, i.e. F1 = F2;
2) and their probability measures are equal on any condi-
tion U ∈ R and σ-algebras ΣU , i.e. for any U ∈ R,
V ∈ ΣU , P1(V |U) = P2(V |U).
Importantly though, one cannot derive a unique causal space
from a probability space; that is to say, given a probability
space, there is in general more than one causal space that
can give rise to it. Crucially, these causal spaces can differ
in the causal dependencies they enforce on the events of the
experiment, thus representing incompatible causal realisations.
B. Causal Interventions
The additional causal information contained in causal spaces
serve the purpose of characterising cause-effect relations (e.g.
functional dependencies) and the effects of interventions of a
random experiment. Interventions modify realisation processes
in order to steer the outcome of a random experiment into a
desired direction.
We begin this subsection with the formalisation of a sub-
process as a sequence of realisations of the experiment, that
is, as a realisation interval.
Definition 12 (Interval). Let U, V ∈ R. Define
I := {W ∈ R : U ⊃W and W ⊃ V }.
Then, based on I, define:
[U, V ]R := I, (closed interval)
(U, V ]R := I \ {U}, (right-closed interval)
[U, V )R := I \ {V }, (left-closed interval)
(U, V )R := I \ {U, V }. (open interval)
Obviously, for all U, V ∈ R,
[U, V ]R 6= ∅ ⇔ U ⊃ V,
so that non-empty intervals necessarily have a causal direction.
Although the previous definition covers open, half-open, and
closed intervals, we will see further down that only closed
intervals play an important roˆle in the context of interventions.
For example, in Fig. 17 we have:
[S0, S12]R = {S0, S2, S5, S12}
[S0, S12)R = {S0, S2, S5}
[S12, S0]R = ∅.
In a random experiment, two sub-processes with the same
initial conditions can lead to two different outcomes. Next, I
define a bifurcation and a discriminant, the former correspond-
ing to the exact moment when these two processes separate
from each other and the latter to the instant right afterwards—
that is, the instant that unambiguously determines the start of
a new causal course. Notice that in what follows, I will drop
the subscript R when it is clear from the context.
Definition 13 (Bifurcations & Discriminants). Let R be a set
of realisations, and let I1 = [U, V1] and I2 = [U, V2] be two
closed intervals in R with same initial starting point U and
non-overlapping endpoints V1 ∩ V2 = ∅. A member λ ∈ R is
said to be a bifurcation of I1 and I2 iff [U, λ] = I1 ∩ I2. A
member ξ ∈ R is said to be a discriminant of I1 from I2 iff
I1 \ I2 = [ξ, V1].
For instance, relative to the causal space in Fig. 17, consider
the intervals
[S0, S7]R and [S0, S9]R.
Then, the bifurcation is S1, because
[S0, S7]R ∩ [S0, S9]R = [S0, S1]R;
and their discriminants are S3 and S4 respectively, because
[S0, S7]R \ [S0, S9]R = [S3, S7]R and
[S0, S9]R \ [S0, S7]R = [S4, S9]R.
In principle, bifurcations and discriminants might not exist;
or if they exist, they might not be unique. The following
lemma disproves this possibility by showing that bifurcations
and discriminants always exist and are unique.
Lemma 14. LetR be a set of realisations, and let I1 = [U, V1]
and I2 = [U, V2] be two closed intervals inR with same initial
starting point U and non-overlapping endpoints V1∩V2 = ∅.
Then, there exists
a) a unique bifurcation of I1 and I2;
b) a unique discriminant of I1 from I2;
c) and a unique discriminant of I2 from I1.
Proof: First, we observe that there cannot be any V ∈ I1
such that V ∩V1 = ∅. For if this was true, then we would have
that for all W ∈ [V, V1], W ∩ V1 = ∅, which would lead to a
contradiction since we know that for W = V1, W ∩ V1 6= ∅.
Repeating the same argument for I2, we also conclude that
there cannot be any V ∈ I2 such that V ∩ V2 = ∅.
Second, using a similar argument as above, if V ∈ I1 is
such that V ∩V2 = ∅, then for all W ∈ [V, V1], W ∩V2 = ∅;
and if V ∈ I1 is such that V ∩ V2 6= ∅, then for all W ∈
[Ω, V ], W ∩V 6= ∅. This leads us to conclude that I1 can be
partitioned into
[U,R1) := {W ∈ I1 : W ∩ V2 6= ∅}
and (S1, V1] := {W ∈ I1 : W ∩ V2 = ∅},
for some R1, S1 ⊂ Ω, that is to say, where I1 = [U,R1) ∪
(S1, V1] and [U,R1) ∩ (S1, V1] = ∅. But, due to axiom R4,
both intervals must be closed. Hence, in particular, it is true
that [Ω, R1) = [Ω, λ1] for some λ1 ∈ I1. Similarly, I2 can be
partitioned into
[U,R2) := {W ∈ I2 : W ∩ V1 6= ∅}
and (S2, V2] := {W ∈ I2 : W ∩ V1 = ∅},
and again, [U,R2) = [U, λ2] for some λ2 ∈ I2. Now, if W ∈
I1 ∪I2, then W ∈ [U, λ1]⇔W ∈ [U, λ2]. Hence, λ1 = λ2 is
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unique and is a bifurcation, proving part (a). For parts (b) and
(c), we note that (R1, V1] = [ξ1, V1] and (R2, V2] = [ξ2, V2]
for some ξ1 ∈ I1 \ I2 and ξ2 ∈ I2 \ I1 respectively due to
axiom R4. But since I1 \ I2 = I1 \ [U, λ1] = [ξ1, V1], and
similarly I2 \ I1 = [ξ2, V2], the members ξ1 and ξ2 are the
desired discriminants, and they are unique.
The important consequence of this lemma is that there
is always a pair of closed intervals [λ, ξ1] and [λ, ξ2] that
precisely capture the sub-process, or mechanism, during which
a realisation can split into two mutually exclusive causal
branches.
To intervene a random experiment in order to give rise to
a particular event A, we first need to identify all the sub-
processes that can split the course of the realisation into
intervals leading to A or its negation Ac. These sub-processes
will start and end at instants that will be called A-bifurcations
and A-discriminants respectively. Again, a lemma guarantees
that these sub-processes exist and are unique.
Definition 15 (A-Bifurcations, A-Discriminants). Let R be
a set of realisations, and let A ∈ σ(R) be a member of the
generated σ-algebra of R.
1) A member λ ∈ R is said to be an A-bifurcation iff it is
a bifurcation of two intervals [Ω, VA] and [Ω, VAc ] with
endpoints VA and VAc in some representations of A and
Ac respectively. The set of A-bifurcations is the subset
λ(A) ⊂ R of all A-bifurcations.
2) Let λ ∈ λ(A) be an A-bifurcation. A member ξ ∈ R is
said to be an A-discriminant for λ iff there exists VA in
a representation of A such that [ξ, VA] = [Ω, VA]\[Ω, λ].
The set of A-discriminants for λ is denoted as ξ(λ).
Figure 18 illustrates the set of A-bifurcations for A defined
as
A = S7 ∪ S9 ∪ S12 ∪ S13 = {1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}.
The set of A-bifurcations is
λ(A) = {S0, S1, S2, S3, S4}.
Each member has an associated set of A-discriminants. For
instance,
ξ(S0) = {S1, S2} and ξ(S2) = {S5}.
The critical bifurcations that appear in the figure are a subset
of the bifurcations, and they will be defined later in the text.
Lemma 16. Let R be a set of realisations, and let A ∈ σ(R)
be a member of the generated σ-algebra of R. Then, the set
of A-bifurcations λ(A) and the sets of A-discriminants ξ(λ),
λ ∈ λ(A), exist, are countable, and unique.
Proof: Let A1 and Ac1 be representations of A and Ac
respectively. Consider the set λ1(A) ⊂ R of bifurcations
of [Ω, VA] and [Ω, VAc ] generated by all pairs of endpoints
(VA, VAc) ∈ A × Ac. Due to the representation theorem, we
know that both A and Ac are countable. Therefore, A×Ac and
λ1(A) are countable too. Now, repeat the same procedure to
construct a set λ2(A) of bifurcations from two representations
A2 and Ac2 of A and Ac respectively.
S0
1/2 1/2
3/4 1/4 1/4 3/4
3/4 1/4 1/4 3/4 1/4 3/4 3/4 1/4
S1 S2
S6S5S4S3
S7 S8 S9 S10 S12 S13 S14 S15
A
target
set bifurcation
critical
bifurcation
Fig. 18. A-bifurcations.
Let R ∈ λ1(A). Then, there exists RA ∈ A1 and RAc ∈
Ac1 such that [Ω, R] = [Ω, RA] ∩ [Ω, RAc ]. Since A2 and Ac2
are representations of A and Ac respectively, there must be
members SA ∈ A2 and SAc ∈ Ac2 such that RA ∩ SA 6= ∅
and RAc ∩ SAc 6= ∅. Due to axiom R2, it must be that either
RA ⊂ SA or SA ⊂ RA; similarly, either RAc ⊂ SAc or
SAc ⊂ RAc . But then, [Ω, SA] ∩ [Ω, SAc ] = [Ω, R], implying
that R ∈ λ2(A). Since R is arbitrary, λ1(A) = λ2(A). Hence,
we have proven that λ(A) exists, is countable, and unique.
Let λ ∈ λ(A) be an arbitrary A-bifurcation. Let A1 and A2
be two representations of A. Because A-representations are
countable, there exists a countable number of intervals [Ω, VA],
VA ∈ A1, containing λ and an associated discriminant. Let
ξ1(λ) be the collection of those discriminants. Following an
argument analogous as above, it is easy to see that ξ2(λ), the
set of discriminants constructed from the intervals associated
to the representation A, must be equal to ξ1(λ). Hence, for
each λ ∈ λ(A), ξ(λ) exists, is countable and unique.
We are now ready to define interventions on a causal space.
In the next definition, an A-intervention is defined as the
change of the causal measure at the bifurcations such that
the desired event A will inevitably take place. This is done
by removing all the probability mass leading to the undesired
event Ac and renormalising thereafter.
Definition 17 (Intervention). Let R be a set of realisations,
P be a causal measure, and A be a member of the generated
σ-algebra of R. A causal measure P′ is said to be an A-
intervention of P iff for all U, V ∈ R such that V ∩A 6= ∅,
P′(V |U) ·G(U, V ) = P(V |U), (1)
where G(U, V ) is the gain of the interval [U, V ] defined by
G(U, V ) :=
∏
λ∈Λ
∑
ξ∈ξ(λ)
P(ξ|λ). (2)
Here, Λ := [U, V ] ∩ λ(A) is the set of bifurcations in [U, V ],
and each ξ(λ) is the set of A-discriminants of λ ∈ Λ.
In the tree visualisation, an A-intervention can be thought of
as a reallocation of the probability mass at the A-bifurcations
(see Fig. 19). Essentially, this is done by first removing the
probability mass from the transitions that do not have any
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successor realisation in A and then by renormalising the
remaining transitions, i.e. the ones rooted at A-discriminants.
S0
1/2 1/2
3/4 1/4 1 0
1 0 1 0 1/4 3/4 3/4 1/4
S1 S2
S6S5S4S3
S7 S8 S9 S10 S12 S13 S14 S15
A
Fig. 19. A-intervention.
Theorem 18 (Uniqueness of A-Interventions). Let R be a
set of realisations, P be a causal measure, and A be a
member of the generated σ-algebra of R. The A-intervention
is unique if for each bifurcation λ ∈ λ(A), the corresponding
A-discriminants are not null, i.e. they are such that∑
ξ∈ξ(λ)
P(ξ|λ) > 0. (3)
Proof: Let P′ be an A-intervention. Because it is a causal
measure, P′(V |U) = 1 when V ⊃ U and P′(V |U) = 0 when
V ∩U = ∅. It remains to check that P′(V |U) is unique when
V ⊂ U . If V ∩A 6= ∅, then the definition applies. Here, λ(A)
and the {ξ(λ)}λ∈λ(A) are unique due to Lemma 14, thus so are
the Λ := [U, V ]∩λ(A) for each U, V ∈ R. Hence, we see that
if condition (3) holds for all λ ∈ λ(A), then (1) has a unique
solution for P′(V |U). Finally, if V ∩ A = ∅ then P′(V |U)
depends on where [U, V ] contains an A-bifurcation. If it does
not, then P′(V |U) = P(V |U). If it does, then Axiom C3
implies P′(V |U) = 0.
Corollary 19. A-interventions are unique up to intervals
containing only null discriminants. In other words, given two
A-interventions P′1 and P
′
2 let U, V ∈ R. Then, P′1(V |U) =
P′2(V |U) if for all λ ∈ [U, V ] ∩ λ(A), there exists ξ ∈ ξ(λ)
such that P(ξ|λ) > 0.
Finally, the next proposition shows that the intervention is
indeed correct in the sense that the desired event occurs with
certainty after the intervention.
Proposition 20. Let R be a set of realisations and let A be a
member of the generated σ-algebra Σ of R. Furthermore, let
P′ be probability measure compatible with an A-intervention
of a causal measure P. Then, P′(A|Ω) = 1.
Proof: Let A and Ac be representations of A and Ac in
R respectively. Then, each V ∈ Ac is such that V ∩ A = ∅.
Hence, due to (I1),
P′(Ac|Ω) =
∑
V ∈Ac
P′(V |Ω) = 0.
But then, since P′ is a probability measure,
P′(A|Ω) = 1− P′(Ac|Ω) = 1.
A closer look at the definition of an A-intervention reveals
that, while the set of bifurcations λ(A) contains all the logi-
cally required bifurcations (i.e. all moments having a branch
leading to the undesired event Ac), some of them remain
unaltered after the intervention. In particular, this is always
the case when the mechanisms assign zero probability to the
branches leading to Ac.
Definition 21 (Critical Bifurcations). Let R be a set of
realisations, P be a causal measure, and A be a member of
the generated σ-algebra of R. A bifurcation λ ∈ λ(A) is said
to be critical iff the corresponding A-discriminants are not
complete, i.e. they are such that∑
ξ∈ξ(λ)
P(ξ|λ) < 1. (4)
Proposition 22. The gain (2) is equal to
G(U, V ) =
∏
λ∈Γ
∑
ξ∈ξ(λ)
P(ξ|λ) (5)
where Γ is the set of critical bifurcations in the interval from
U to V , and each ξ(λ) is the set of A-discriminants of λ ∈ Λ.
Proof: Partition Λ into Γ and Γ = Λ\Γ, where Γ contains
only the critical A-bifurcations. Then,∏
λ∈Λ
∑
ξ∈ξ(λ)
P(ξ|λ) =
{∏
λ∈Γ
∑
ξ∈ξ(λ)
P(ξ|λ)
}
·
{∏
λ∈Γ
∑
ξ∈ξ(λ)
P(ξ|λ)
}
= 1 ·
{∏
λ∈Γ
∑
ξ∈ξ(λ)
P(ξ|λ)
}
=
∏
λ∈Γ
∑
ξ∈ξ(λ)
P(ξ|λ).
C. Random Variables
We recall the formal definition of a random variable. Let
(Ω,Σ,P) be a probability space and (S,Ξ) be a measurable
space. Then an (S,Ξ)-valued random variable is a function
X : Ω→ S which is (Σ,Ξ)-measurable, i.e. for every member
B ∈ Ξ, its preimage X−1(B) ∈ Σ where X−1(B) = {ω :
X(ω) ∈ B}. If we have a collection (Xγ : γ ∈ Γ) of mappings
Xγ : Ω→ Sγ , then
Σ := σ(Xγ : γ ∈ Γ)
is the smallest σ-algebra Σ such that each Xγ is Σ-measurable.
The lesson we have learnt so far is that it is not enough to
just specify the σ-algebra of a random experiment in order
to understand the effect of interventions; rather, we need
to endow the σ-algebra with a causal structure. While one
would expect the same to hold for random variables one
wishes to intervene, we will see that it is not necessary to
explicitly model causal dependencies among them. Instead, it
is sufficient to establish a link to some abstract causal space
that is shared by all the random variables. We begin this
investigation thus with a definition of a function having causal
structure.
Definition 23 (Realisable Function). Let Ω, S be sets and R
and S be sets of realisations over Ω and S respectively. A
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function X : Ω → S is said to be (R,S)-realisable iff for
every B ∈ S , the preimage X−1(B) is a member of R. The
following picture illustrates this:
Ω
X // S
R SX−1oo
The next proposition shows that realisable functions are
measurable functions, but not vice versa—as intuition imme-
diately predicts.
Proposition 24. Let R and S be two sets of realisations over
sets Ω and S respectively. Let Σ = σ(R) and Ξ = σ(S). If
a mapping X : Ω → S is (R,S)-realisable then it is also
(Σ,Ξ)-measurable. However, the converse is not necessarily
true. In a diagram:
Ω
X // S
=⇒
Ω
X // S
R S
X−1
oo Σ Ξ
X−1
oo
Proof: Let B ∈ Ξ. Then, Theorem 4 tells us that there
exists a representation B of B in S . Since X is (R,S)-
realisable, every member V ∈ B has a preimage that is in
R, i.e. X−1(V ) ∈ R. But ⋃V ∈BX−1(V ) = X−1(B) and⋃
V ∈BX
−1(V ) ∈ Σ, hence X is (Σ,Ξ)-measurable.
To disprove the converse, consider the following counterex-
ample. Take Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4} and S = {s1, s2}. Let
R = {R1, . . . R8}, where: R1 = Ω; R2 = {ω1, ω2}; R3 =
{ω3, ω4}; R4 = {ω1}; R5 = {ω2}; R6 = {ω3}; R7 = {ω4};
and R8 = ∅. Furthermore, let S = {S1, S2, S3, S4}, where:
S1 = S; S2 = {s1}; S3 = {s2}; and S4 = ∅. Let X
be such that X(R2) = S2 and X(R6) = S3. Observe that
S1 = S2 ∪ S3 ∈ Ξ and S4 = Sc1 ∈ Ξ, and in particular
S1, S4 ∈ S. However, X−1(S1) = R2 ∪ R6, which is
obviously in Σ but not in R.
Next, realisable random variables are simply defined as
realisable functions endowed with a causal measure.
Definition 25 (Realisable Random Variable). Let (Ω,R,P) be
a causal space. A realisable random variable X is an (S,Ξ)-
valued function that is (R,S)-realisable, where Ξ = σ(S).
Finally, we define the intervention of a random variable. Let
B be a measurable event in Ξ, the σ-algebra in the range of X .
Then, a B-intervention of X is done in two steps: first, B is
translated into its corresponding event A living in the abstract
σ-algebra Σ; second, the resulting event A is intervened.
Definition 26 (Intervention of a Random Variable). Let
(Ω,R,P) be a causal space and let X be a (R,S)-realisable
random variable. Given a set B ∈ Ξ = σ(S) of the generated
σ-algebra, a B-intervention of the realisable random variable
X is a X−1(B)-intervention of the causal measure P.
Corollary 27. B-interventions of a realisable random vari-
able are unique up to intervals containing only null discrimi-
nants.
This concludes our abstract model of causality. It is immedi-
ately seen that a causal stochastic process can be characterised
as a collection (Xγ : γ ∈ Γ) of (R,Sγ)-realisable random
variables X : Ω → Sγ respectively defined over a shared
causal space (Ω,R,P). This is in perfect accordance with the
theory so far developed.
For instance, consider a collection of four binary random
variables X,Y, Z, and U accommodated within the causal
space C = (Ω,R,P) from the example shown in Fig. 17.
For these random variables to be realisable, they must map
elements from the sample space Ω into S = {0, 1} such
that the partition induced contains only members in the set
of realisations R. This is achieved by ensuring that each path
from the root to a leave contains exactly one value assignment
for each random variable (technically, a cut through the tree)
as exemplified in Fig. 20. For instance, all the realisation
paths must necessarily pass either through S1 or S2 where
X assumes the value X = 0 or X = 1 respectively.
1/2 1/2
3/4 1/4
3/4 1/4 1/4 3/4
X=0
Y=0
U=0
Z=0 Z=1 Z=0 Z=1
Y=1
U=1
1/4 3/4
1/4 3/4 3/4 1/4
X=1
Y=0 Y=1 Y=0 Y=1
Z=0 Z=1
U=1
S0
S1 S2
S6S5
S4S3
S7 S8 S9 S10 S12 S13 S14 S15
Fig. 20. A causal stochastic process.
The causal measure over R extends to the random variables
in the obvious way; thus here, we have
P(X = 0) =
1
2
, P(X = 1) =
1
2
,
P(Y = 0|X = 0) = 3
4
, P(Y = 1|X = 0) = 1
4
,
P(Z = 0|X = 1) = 1
4
, P(Z = 1|X = 1) = 3
4
,
...
and so on.
The example also illustrates the possibility of modelling
dynamically instantiated causal dependencies. This is seen by
noting that Y precedes Z if X = 0 but Y succeeds Z if X =
1, i.e. X is a second-order causal dependency that controls
whether Y causes Z or vice versa. Obviously, the same idea
can be applied to model higher-order causal dependencies.
Fig. 21 shows three interventions, namely X ← 1, Z ← 1,
and U ← 0, where the critical bifurcations are highlighted with
thicker outlines. As mentioned before, the intervention X ← 1
picks the direction of the causal dependency of the pair (Y, Z)
by setting Z to be the cause and Y its effect. If instead the
subject is interested in finding out how to bring about Z = 1
herself, then she can do so by inspecting the intervention Z ←
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0 1
3/4 1/4 1/4 3/4
3/4 1/4 1/4 3/4 1/4 3/4 3/4 1/4
X=0 X=1
Y=0
U=0
Z=0 Z=1 Z=0 Z=1 Y=0 Y=1 Y=0 Y=1
Y=1
U=1 Z=0 Z=1
U=1
1/2 1/2
3/4 1/4
0 1 0 1
X=0
Y=0
U=0
Z=0 Z=1 Z=0 Z=1
Y=1
U=1
1 0
1 0
3/4 1/4 1/4 3/4
X=0
Y=0
U=0
Z=0 Z=1 Z=0 Z=1
Y=1
U=1
0 1
1/4 3/4 3/4 1/4
X=1
Y=0 Y=1 Y=0 Y=1
Z=0 Z=1
U=1
1/4 3/4
1/4 3/4 3/4 1/4
X=1
Y=0 Y=1 Y=0 Y=1
Z=0 Z=1
U=1
Fig. 21. Three example interventions.
1. Enumerating the critical bifurcations, she can conclude that
there are three mutually exclusive circumstances where this
can ocurr, following two different causal narratives. Finally,
she decides to pick the leftmost one through the intervention
U ← 1 which combines changes at two critical bifurcations.
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